Headquarters U.S. Air Force

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AF Operational Approach to Disease Containment



Lt Col Hudson XOS-FC 20 Sep 2005



U.S. AIR FORCE



Background

- May 2003, OSD released DoD Directive 6200.3, Emergency Health Powers on Military Installations, in response to SARS outbreaks
 - Protects installations, facilities, and personnel in the event of a public health emergency
 - Empowers commanders to declare public health emergencies and impose quarantine
- DoDD 6200.3 guidance incomplete and unclear regarding:
 - Operational considerations (mission impacts, risk management, OCONUS bases, etc)
 - Cross-functional responsibilities
 - Alternatives to compulsory quarantine
 - Authority to control non-military personnel
 - Criteria/authority/process to declare public health emergency



Beyond DoDD 6200.3: Disease Containment

- Adopt holistic approach to public health emerge ico a Ch
 - Leverage cross-functional skills (not solely a medical issue)
- Move beyond casualty management—focus on disease containment
- Balance mission criticality with risk to personnel, if required
- Account for uncertainty ... limited information
- Identify preparation and planning required to implement response options
- Address security, resource, legal and political implications of containing an outbreak

Medical intervention (vaccination and prophylaxis) and limiting exposure (social distancing and protection) are



AF's C-BW Efforts and DoD Disease Response



Jan 02

Smallpox

Plan



May 03 DoDD 6200.3 Sep 04
Pandemic
Influenza
Plan

Sep 04
Avian
Influenza
Guidance

Apr 00 - 01 AF Conducts I C-BW Apr 02
AF completes
Bio-Defense
Guidelines

Oct 03
AF begins
work on
DCP

May 04 - Apr 05 KFE validates the L DCP

Sep 11 and anthrax attacks highlight need for capability

CSAF stands-up Bio-Defense Task Force

AFI to implement DoDD 6200.3

DCP to address all contagious agents

AF working to develop operationally-based C-BW guidance in a rapidly changing policy environment



Why Consolidate?

- DoD released four disease response plans over the last three years for implementation across the Services: Smallpox, SARS, Avian Influenza, and Pandemic Influenza
- Actions are similar yet the concept of operations varies
- Plans are medical centric—some information is already provided in existing plans
- Exercises and evaluations revealed confusion and limited implementation at AF installations
- Existing plans:
 - Do not address operational considerations
 - Assume a known disease
 - Lack cross-functional approach
- "Development of one overarching plan ensures a consistent proach that is more likely to lead to successful implementation" Dr.



Elements of the Disease Containment Plan (1 of 3)


- Purpose: Translate guidance from DoDD 6200.3 and DoD disease response plans into a base-level plan to prepare for and respond to contagious disease outbreaks in order to protect installations, facilities, and personnel while minimizing the impact on operations
- Applicability: Naturally occurring disease outbreak or outbreaks resulting from intentional biological attacks
- Baseline assumptions:
 - Sentinel casualties may be first indication of an attack
 - Disease outbreaks due to attacks may be indistinguishable from naturally occurring outbreaks
 - Must assume contagious agent until disease is identified
 - Several days may pass before the causative agent is identified
 - Commanders will need to make critical, time-sensitive decisions in an environment of uncertainty



Elements of the Disease Containment Plan (2 of 3)

- Preparation Guides the planning to integrate base-wide functional capabilities to prevent or reduce impact of an outbreak
- Immediate Response
 - Avoid exposure non-medical actions can be used to prevent/limit exposure and allow operations to continue, as required
 - Medical interventions timelines for act compressed and must identify and treat symptomatic/non-symptomatic personne
- Continued Response identify actions to sustain responses and transition to long-term operations

The DCP provides a layered approach that tailors risk-based options to an event in order to prevent and mitigate a contagious disease while maintaining the ability to continue the mission



Elements of the Disease Containment Plan (3 of 3)

Sample DCP Checklist

Ite m	Task	OPR/OCR
	 Initiate epidemiological investigation Establish case definition Identify pathogen, assume contagious Initiate contact tracing Intensify medical surveillance Ensure chain of custody for specimens 	MDG PHEO SFS
	 Implement voluntary or dorm to duty quarantine Provide legal notification of quarantine Ensure facilities are adequate and meet environmental standards Healthcare contact monitoring (active and passive monitoring Delivery of food, supplies, waste and laundry removal 	CC PHEO SVS TRN JA
	 Implement communications and public affairs plan Implement tailored public affairs plan for base community Ensure resources available for healthcare workers to field calls Conduct contact tracing or quarantine monitoring 	PHEO Comm PA
	• Ensure pase မှာမှာမျောင်းတွေ မှုရန္ဓ ခု၎၄၉၁နှင့် ဥဝ ငှဝ၉ာက္ကယာရှင်ချားပြာ with family	



Validating the DCP

- XOS-FC leads an operationally focused, cross-functional team to develop an Air Force C-BW CONOPS and improve bio-defense guidance for mission recovery and sustainment of operations
- Kunsan Focused Effort (KFE) was the cornerstone of the C-BW effort
- Kunsan Air Base refined draft DCP through table top and field exercises during the year-long effort
 - Wing Commander and senior staff involvement
 - Cross-functional approach integrated capabilities
 - Tested new and emerging strategies
 - Evaluated the operational impacts of implementing various preparation, response, and containment measures
 - Addressed OCONUS bases and other legal issues
- Approach validated by Kunsan three-day base-wide exercise



Benefits of the DCP as "the" AF Disease

- Eliminates the need for numerouRdB&QQQEGQIRGAN
 - Promotes consistency and avoids confusion and redundancy
- Provides a flexible, symptom-based approach to disease outbreaks
 - Adaptable for emerging diseases
- Addresses disease containment from a cross-functional approach
 - Permits annexes for functional or disease-specific information and guidance
- Addresses dual threat
 - Bio-terrorism/bio-warfare
 - Naturally occurring outbreaks
- Enables C-BW CONOPS risk-management decision making
 - Limits the spread of disease while minimizing ops impacts



QUESTIONS?



This resource is available from the XOS-FC website https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xos/xosf/xosfc (UNCLASSIFIED)